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Abstract—There have been several attempts to develop a
comprehensive account of the requirements for voting systems,
particularly for public elections. Typically, these approaches
identify a number of “high level” principals which are then
refined either into more detailed statements or more formal
constructs. Unfortunately, these approaches do not acknowledge
the complexity and diversity of the contexts in which voting takes
place.
This paper takes a different approach by arguing that the
only requirement for a voting system is that it is accurate. More
detailed requirements can then be derived from this high level
requirement for the particular context in which the system is
implemented and deployed.
A general, formal high level model for voting systems and their
context is proposed. Several related definitions of accuracy for
voting systems are then developed, illustrating how the term “ac-
curacy” is in interpreted in different contexts. Finally, a context
based requirement for voting system privacy is investigated as
an example of deriving a subsidiary requirement from the high
level requirement for accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A large number of attempts have been made to catalogue the
requirements for voting systems, some by computer scientists
(e.g. [1]–[4]) and some as part of legislative frameworks or
standards for the deployment of voting systems in public
elections (e.g. [5]–[7]). Typically, these approaches identify
“top-level” requirements for voting systems (secrecy, privacy,
equality, integrity, usability and so on.), and then proceed to
successively refine these categories with further sub-categories
and natural language statements of requirements. These ap-
proaches suffer from the usual limitations of natural language
requirements documents:
• Conflation of requirements with implementations.
Tjøstheim, for example, provides a model for
requirements for voting systems based on a particular
procedural and technological environment for the system
(paper based polling station voting with some form of
encrypted receipt) [8]. Similarly, Rivest has recently
argued for a definition of a “software independence”
requirement for voting systems, something which is only
relevant to voting systems which are computer based
[9]. The problem which arises in such situations is to
decide which requirements are applicable to different
voting systems.
• Conflicts between requirements. The Voluntary Voting
System Guidelines (VVSG), for example, require voting
systems to ensure voting privacy, whilst also permitting
the implementation of Closed Audio Loop devices, which
broadcast the results of interactions with a voting system
over unencrypted radio frequencies for detection by hear-
ing aids [6].
• Incompleteness and requirements evolution. Assessment
of whether the requirements set covers all aspects of
the voting context for the voting system is difficult.
Even very extensive requirements approaches such as
the VVSG are expected to be extended for new types
of voting systems [6]. This is typically because existing
requirements approaches attempt to prepare a catalogue
of requirements applicable across all voting contexts, with
accompanying notes of exemptions for individual cases.
Academic approaches have attempted to develop rigorous
formal definitions of particular properties commonly thought
to be desirable for voting systems. Such definitions are usually
used to formally evaluate cryptographic voting schemes rather
than full voting systems. Ryan and Peacock, for example,
adopt the notion of system indistinguishability as a means of
defining voting privacy [10]. Informally, this approach defines
a voting system as providing privacy if an observer cannot
distinguish between any two pairs of runs of the system in
which two voters swap votes. This approach accepts that a
voting system cannot provide privacy where all voters cast the
same vote and also assumes that all voters cast the same form
of vote. Alternatively, Juels and Jakobsson provide a definition
of strong coercion resistance (voter anonymity), in which an
observer cannot determine whether a voter even participated
in an election [11].
These two definitions illustrate an important objection to
existing requirements approaches: there is a substantial lack
of agreement as to what is actually required. Some authors
require voting privacy, others require voter anonymity. Some
requirements approaches explicitly assume that the list of
voters who participated in an election will be published in
order to provide for verification of votes cast [12]. The plethora
of voting contexts has lead to a plethora of apparently conflict-
ing requirements documentation for voting systems. Pieters
has similarly noted the simultaneous success and failure of
deployments of similar voting systems in diverse cultural and
legal settings [13].
It would seem that the approach adopted by many computer
scientists in attempting to specify and develop a single perfect
voting system, is doomed to failure, due to the diversity of
requirements in different contexts. Whilst this statement may
appear somewhat obvious, particularly in the context of socio-
technical system research, it is not evident that such a view
is accepted in the academic cryptographic or security formal
methods communities. Voting systems are implemented as
a result of compromises between various factors, such as
the desired electoral system, the cultural practices associated
with voting and the perceived threats in a particular electoral
context.
This paper is a first attempt at providing a methodology
for deriving context dependent voting system requirements.
We begin with an abstract model for a voting system and its
context at its most abstract. We use this model to define a
single high-level requirement for the voting system in terms
of the system’s ability to accurately record and then tally the
intentions of legitimate voters at an election. We argue that
this requirement is the fundamental requirement for voting sys-
tems. Tjøstheim et al and Schneier have made similar remarks
in their own approach to voting system requirements [8], [14].
We argue that all other requirements for a voting system can
then be derived from this single high level requirement for
a particular context. The refinements chosen are part of the
specification and design process for the voting system for a
particular context. For example:
• system integrity is directly related to accuracy, with the
intention that a system is not violated and subsequently
produce an inaccurate result;
• requirements for voter equality are intended to ensure
that particular groups of voters are not disadvantaged
when using a system, potentially biasing the final result
produced during an election;
• requirements which specify the usability of a system are
intended to prevent voters accidentally recording votes
other than their true intentions;
• the common requirement for voting privacy is specified
when it is desirable to prevent voters casting votes other
than their true intention even if someone should attempt
to coerce them.
Although requirements for voting systems will inevitably be
different for different contexts (as well as changing over time),
our intention is that using a uniform methodology for deriving
requirements allows comparisons to be made between contexts
and similarities to be discovered. We argue that this approach
has the additional benefit of easing the transfer of voting
systems between contexts by making explicit the change in
requirements.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an
abstract definition of a voting system and its context. Formal
definitions of both the voting context and voting system are
provided using the Z specification language [15] with some
syntax from the CADiZ extended toolkit [16]. We have chosen
Fig. 1. Model of voting system and context.
to formalise the definition of electoral context and voting
system model in this way in order to provide a precise
definition of the concepts discussed. In addition, we believe the
work described in this paper is a useful example of research
spanning the fields of formal methods and socio-technical
systems. Section III presents some alternative specifications of
accuracy for a voting system. Section IV extends the context
model by adding the possibility of voter coercion, and thus the
means of defining what a system must achieve to thwart this
attack. The purpose here is to demonstrate that a requirement
for privacy specified in some voting context is in fact derived
from the need for a voting system to be accurate with respect
to voters’ intentions. Section V summarises the work and
identifies some future extensions.
II. VOTING SYSTEM MODEL
First, we need to give a definition of the context in which
a voting system operates. In doing so, we limit the scope of
our concern to the operation of the voting system, rather than
wider aspects of election regulation:
An election is a device by which a number of au-
tonomous parties (voters) make a collective decision
based on individual preferences (votes), according to
a set of rules for aggregating preferences (electoral
system). The set of voters eligible to participate in
an election is termed the electorate. Membership
of the electorate for an election is defined by a
set of rules describing eligibility criteria called the
franchise. The translation between votes cast and
the aggregated result is computed in accordance
with an implementation of the electoral system. The
purpose of a voting system is to accurately collect
and aggregate the legitimate intended votes of some
voters for a number of elections. The result produced
by a voting system is used to decide the outcome for
an election, i.e. the consequences of the result.
Figure 1 gives a visual presentation of this definition as an
information flow diagram. The voting system is a ‘black box’
process which maps voting intentions for a single election to
a result. The result is then used as input to a decision process
which determines an outcome. The definition of intention here
is limited to what is considered a legitimate construction of a
vote in a given context. A legitimate intention may include a
voter’s decision to abstain or cast a non-vote, depending on
the context. At this stage, we are concerned with providing
a model for a voting system’s context and operation, rather
than specifying requirements on it. Thus, the model will not
incorporate explicit requirements concerning the accuracy of
the voting system.
To begin the Z specification, we introduce the basic types
for the entities in the schema, drawn from the definition given
above:
[VOTER,ELECTION,VOTE,RESULT,OUTCOME]
The definition of an electoral context can now be formalised
as a schema:
ElectoralContext
franchise : ELECTION → PVOTER
intention : VOTER× ELECTION → VOTE
electoralSystem : bagVOTE → RESULT
decision : RESULT → OUTCOME
∀ voter : VOTER; election : ELECTION •
(voter, election) ∈ dom intention
⇔ voter ∈ franchise(election)
The franchise for the voting context (line 1) is a function
giving the set of voters eligible to participate in an election.
The franchise will vary for each election as some voters be-
come eligible, and others are disqualified. A voter’s intention
(line 2) is a function which maps from a voter and an election
to a vote. The electoral system (line 3) is a function which
translate a collection of votes (a bag in Z) into a result. A
result for an election will translate into an outcome (line 4).
The expression (line 5,6,7) sets the domain of the intention
function to be all pairings of elections and their corresponding
electorates. That is, voters only express legitimate intentions
for elections in which they are eligible to participate.
The definition of electoral context given above includes an
implicit definition of a voting system. To restate: the purpose
of a voting system is to collect and aggregate the legitimate
intended votes of a set of voters for an election into a result.
Typically, a voting system can be considered as two separate
concerns (Figure 2): the recording of voters’ intended votes
Fig. 2. Model of voting system refined into collecting and tallying operations.
(vote collection); and the translation of recorded votes into
a result (tallying). The figure illustrates that vote collection
sub-process takes the current election and voting intentions as
input. The votes collection process produces a collection of
votes which are derived from the voter’s intentions (possibly
inaccurately). The Z schema for the collection of votes is given
below:
CollectVotes
ElectoralContext
election? : ELECTION
intentions? : P(VOTER× ELECTION × VOTE)
recorded : P(VOTER× ELECTION × VOTE)
∀ voter : VOTER; election : ELECTION;
vote : VOTE •
(voter, election, vote) ∈ intentions?⇔
election = election? ∧
intention(voter, election) = vote
The schema includes the previous definition of electoral
context given above (line 1). The schema defines an election
and a set of voting intentions for the election as inputs to the
voting system (lines 2,3). The expression (lines 5-9) restricts
the set intentions? which are input to the voting system to
those of voters for the current election. An additional internal
variable recorded is introduced (line 4) which refers to the
voting intentions as recorded by the voting system.
Figure 2 also illustrates the process of translating votes
held by the voting system into a result. This process of
tallying votes takes votes from (a) the votes recorded as
voting intentions from voters and (b) other votes potentially
introduced into the voting system, for example through some
nefarious activity. The Z schema for tallying of votes is:
TallyVotes
CollectVotes
result! : RESULT
recorded votes : bagVOTE
other votes : bagVOTE
votes : bagVOTE
recorded votes = {
voter : VOTER; election : ELECTION;
vote : VOTE; n : N |
(voter, election, vote) ∈ recorded ∧
n = #{voter2 : VOTER;
election2 : ELECTION;
vote2 : VOTE |
(voter2, election2, vote2) ∈
recorded ∧ vote2 = vote} • vote 7→ n}
votes = recorded votes unionmulti other votes
The schema defines an output result! (line 2). The
recorded votes variable (line 3,6-14) denotes the collection of
votes derived from recorded voting intentions (recorded). The
votes used by a voting machine for tallying are those votes
which were recorded as the intentions of voters, as well as
possibly other extra errant votes that were introduced prior to
tallying (lines 4,5,15).
So we can now define a voting system:
VotingSystem == CollectVotes ∧ TallyVotes
At this stage of refinement, no attempt has been made to
specify the relationship between the intended votes and the
recorded intentions, nor between the votes collected and the
aggregated result.
III. VOTING SYSTEM ACCURACY
The previous section provided a basic model for a voting
system and context (VotingSystem). In this section, several
interpretations of an accuracy requirement are proposed. In an
ideal world, it might be nice to require a perfectly accurate
voting system to be implemented:
PerfectVotingSystem
VotingSystem
recorded = intentions?
other votes = ∅
electoralSystem(votes) = result!
That is, the voting system exactly records the intentions of
all the voters (line 2), no extra votes are introduced (line 3),
and the result produced at the end is correct with respect to the
relevant electoral system (line 4). However, practical voting
systems are not generally implemented to provide perfect
accuracy, but accuracy that is “good enough”. One possible
interpretation of “good enough” for a voting system, is that the
difference between the correct result and the result provided
by the voting system does not alter the outcome of an election:
OutcomeAccurateVotingSystem
VotingSystem
intended votes : bagVOTE
intended votes = {
voter : VOTER; election : ELECTION;
vote : VOTE; n : N |
(voter, election, vote) ∈ intentions? ∧
n = #{voter2 : VOTER; election2 : ELECTION;
vote2 : VOTE |
(voter2, election2, vote2) ∈ intentions?
∧ vote2 = vote} • vote 7→ n}
decision(result!) =
decision(electoralSystem(intended votes))
The schema introduces a new collection of votes which are
intended to be cast by eligible voters in the election (line 2).
The expression in lines 11-12 requires that the result (result!)
produced by the voting system (however it is obtained) gives
the same outcome as the application of the electoral system
specification to the collection of votes intended by the voters
in the election. A voting system which implements the simple
plurality electoral system, for example, would be satisfactory
if it always accurately identified the candidate with the most
number of votes.
However, such a definition is often politically unacceptable
if, for example, the distribution of funding at subsequent
elections is dependent on a candidates share of votes. The
schema below gives a measured definition of accuracy:
MeasuredVotingSystem
VotingSystem
collAcy : R
resultOrder : order RESULT
devianceInterval : PRESULT
talAcy : R
collAcy =
#(recorded ∩ intentions?) div bagsize votes
devianceInterval = {r : RESULT |
((result!, r) ∈ resultOrder ∧
(r, electoralSystem(intended votes)) ∈
resultOrder) ∨
((r, result!) ∈ resultOrder ∧
(electoralSystem(intended votes), r) ∈
resultOrder)}
talAcy = 1−#devianceInterval div #RESULT
Lines 2,6 and 7 define collection accuracy to be the
normalised (number of intended votes and additional votes)
difference between the set of recorded votes and the set of
intended votes. One consequence of this definition means
that the swapping of the intentions of two voters reduces the
accuracy of the voting system.
The accuracy of the tally is measured by assuming a partial
ordering on the set of possible results (line 4). Line 5 and
8-14 define the interval between the result computed by the
voting system and the true result as computed by the electoral
system on the set of intended votes within the set of all
possible results. The tally accuracy (lines 5 and 15) is then
the normalised size of the interval between the actual result
produced by the voting system and the ideal result that would
be produced by a perfect implementation of the electoral
system on the set of actual votes.
IV. DEFINING VOTING PRIVACY IN TERMS OF ACCURACY
Given the definitions above, we can now investigate a
definition of voting privacy requirements in order to support
our argument that accuracy is the primary requirement of
voting systems. The initial step is to define a voting system
in the context of an attacker who wishes to coerce voters
into changing their votes (a coercer). A coercer will seek to
induce voters to record votes which are different from their
true intentions in order to achieve a particular outcome for
the election. The coercer may also wish to observe recorded
intentions to satisfy themselves that their objective has been
achieved. The Z schema for the coercible context is given
below:
CoercionContextVS
VotingSystem
desired? : P(ELECTION × VOTER× VOTE)
coerced : P(ELECTION × VOTER× VOTE)
observedC! : P(ELECTION × VOTER× VOTE)
observedU! : P(ELECTION × VOTER× VOTE)
desired? ∩ intentions? = ∅
coerced = recorded votes ∩ desired?
observedC! ⊂ coerced
observedU! ⊂ desired? \ coerced
The extension to the model specifies the voting intentions
which a coercer wishes to change as an input to the schema
(line 2). The coercer may not be able to successfully coerce all
the votes they desire, so the set of coerced votes represents the
occurrence of desired coerced intentions in the recorded set of
votes (lines 3, 7). For simplicity, the definition excludes from
consideration any of the coercer’s desired voting intentions
which are the same as the voter’s true intention (line 6). This
is acceptable because such intentions are not violated by an
attacker’s attempted coercion and so do not have an influence
on the accuracy of the election. The definition also excludes
any voters who willingly collude with the coercer, for tactical
voting purposes, for example. The outputs from the schema
define the two subsets of recorded votes observed by the
coercer (lines 4,5,8,9). The attacker may be able to observe
some of the successfully coerced votes as well as some of the
recorded votes which do not match their desired intentions.
Typically, the various definitions of coercion resistance in
the cryptographic voting scheme literature (e.g. [11], [17]),
seek to limit the recorded intentions of voters which are
observable by a coercer. In such circumstances, it is argued, a
coercer cannot effectively induce voters to change their votes,
because they cannot be sure that the voter followed their
instructions:
CryptoCoercionResistantVotingSystem
CoercionContextVS
observedC! = ∅ ∧ observedU! = ∅
It may be noted that ensuring that no recorded intentions
are observable by the coercer does not limit the size of the
set of coerced votes. The model reflects this by separating
votes that are coerced from those that are observable as such
by a coercer. The coercer may instead attempt to convince
a voter that their recorded intention is observable by them,
whether this is true or not. One study which investigated the
prospects of introducing computer based voting systems to
UK elections found that some voters believed that their votes
were observable by candidates [18] - because the successful
candidate had thanked them for their support after the election!
A voting system vulnerable to this form of coercion may
be modelled as one in which, for some voters, the true set of
recorded votes observable by the coercer is indistinguishable
from the set of observable votes claimed by the coercer.
When presented with a set of claimed observations of voters
for an election, the voter will believe that some voters’
interactions with the voting system will be observable. In such
circumstances, the voter may be coerced into changing their
recorded vote from their true intention if they believe that their
own interaction with the voting system will be observable by
an coercer. This can be described as follows:
CoercionContextVS2
CoercionContextVS
claimedObs? : ELECTION × VOTER
voterBel : VOTER× P(ELECTION × VOTER)→
P(ELECTION × VOTER)
convincedCoerced :
P(ELECTION × VOTER× VOTE)
claimedObs? ⊆ dom intention?
convincedCoerced = {
∀ election : ELECTION, voter : VOTER,
vote : VOTE | (election, voter, vote) ∈ coerced ∧
(election, voter) ∈
voterBel(voter, claimedObs?)}
The schema defines a subset of voter’s intentions that the
coercer claims to be able to observe (lines 2, 7). In addition
the schema defines for each voter in the election, those claims
regarding observations made by the coercer they will believe
(line 3). The subset of coerced intentions resulting from the
attack (lines 5,8-12) will be the intersection between the claims
made by the attacker and the set of observations that the voter
believes are observable by the attacker.
The possibility is a particular problem for both crypto-
graphic and non-cryptographic voter-verifiable schemes alike,
(e.g. [19]–[22]). Several studies have indicated that voters in
public elections are disinclined to utilise verification mecha-
nisms, or struggle to comprehend them [23], [24]. Storer and
Little’s study suggested that people eligible to participate in
UK public elections had limited confidence in explanations of
why their vote would be kept secret by a relatively simple
internet based voting system [25].
There are several alternative approaches that may be spec-
ified for countering the threat of coercion of this form, for
example, it may be desirable to require that a voting system is
understandable, i.e. that is each voter understands why their
vote is not observable by a coercer. For the definition given
above, this would mean that a voter does not believe the
coercer can observe any voter’s interactions with the voting
system. Alternatively, require that the coercer is restricted in
the claims regarding observability of the voting system they
can make to voters. This requirement might be satisfied by
legislation which threatens severe penalties for claiming the
ability to observe voting intentions with the intent to coerce
voters, for example. In either case, the requirement can be
directly associated to the accuracy of the voting system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented an abstract model of voting
systems as the basis for developing requirements in different
voting contexts in a consistent manner. The paper proposed
a single high level requirement for voting systems (accuracy)
from which all other requirements are derived, contingent on
the system’s context. Several related interpretations of voting
system accuracy are also discussed, highlighting in particular
the distinction between the result of an election and the
outcome. To illustrate the approach to voting system require-
ments, the commonly cited requirement for voting privacy was
investigated in terms of its relationship to accuracy. It was
argued that the requirement for voting privacy (in contexts
where it is specified) is based on the desire to prevent voters
from being inappropriately influenced into recording a vote
which is different from their true intention and thus reducing
the accuracy of system.
Several extensions to the work described are possible. In
particular, the development of requirements for particular
contexts would provide a more comprehensive evaluation of
the proposed framework. A more severe limitation of the work
presented here is that it does not incorporate a requirement for
the timely production of an election result. The elections in
Scotland in 2007, for example, caused consternation because
of the extended delay in extracting records of votes from the
counting system [26]. We could therefore extend our definition
of voting context and system to require a result to be produced
within some specified time period. Although we leave further
investigation of this limitation to future work.
The approach described in this paper was predicated on
the need to avoid producing “yet another” list of desiderata
proposed as being generally applicable as the requirements for
voting systems. Rather, the paper presents a framework for
developing requirements in different contexts. Requirements
for voting systems are not universal; they are based on social,
historical and cultural factors, as well as the perceived threat
environment.
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